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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
FEDERALISM IN THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION
Ellen A. Peters*
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Edited by Brad-

ley D. McGraw. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1985. Pp. xxiii, 335.
In State v. Jewett, decided last summer by the Supreme Court of
Vermont, that court confronted a problem that has become all too
familiar to state courts in recent years: "[A] state constitutional issue
has been squarely raised, but neither party has presented any substantive analysis or argument on this issue."' The absence of analysis or
argument, the court held, constituted inadequate briefing and deprived
the court of the record it needed to address the proper ambit of the
applicable state constitutional provision. Perhaps because the case involved an appeal from a criminal conviction, the court did not simply
decline to consider the issue but instead ordered supplemental briefs.
Counsel were directed to inform themselves and the court about historical data, textual analysis, case law from other states, and economic, sociological, and ethical materials that might illuminate the
relevant state constitutional provision. Among the resources to which
the court directed counsel was Developments in State Constitutional
Law,
Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw is a collection of essays
delivered at a conference held in March 1984 in Williamsburg, Virginia. The conference was organized by the Conference of Chief Justices, the National Center for State Courts, and the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law of the College of William and Mary. Its purpose was to
assist state courts in an area where the law has been, in the words of
Chief Justice Edward Hennessey of the Supreme Judicial Court of
' '2
Massachusetts, "disjointed, uncoordinated, and uncommunicated.
The essays produced for the conference should indeed point state
courts in the direction of a more sophisticated inquiry into the role
properly to be assigned to state constitutions as they emerge from the
* Chief Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court. B.A. 1951, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1954,
Yale Law School. Chief Justice Peters was a regular member of the faculty of the Yale Law
School from 1956 to 1978 and an adjunct faculty member from 1978 to 1984. - Ed.
1. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985).
2. McGraw, Preface (p. vii).
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long shadow cast, for the last sixty years, by the Constitution of the
United States. Unavoidably, Developments, by its emphasis on the
general, systemic consideration of the underlying issues and arguments, leaves unresolved many of the specific problems that an emergent state constitutional law poses for state courts. It is therefore
especially noteworthy that the essays hold out promise for the preparation of additional resources in the future, since they signal a revival
of interest in the subject of state constitutions by the scholarly community. 3 The dearth of scholarly analyses, due chiefly to the preoccupation of constitutional scholars with the work of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the United States Constitution, 4 has unquestionably increased the difficulties that state courts have encountered in their nascent efforts to take state constitutional rights
seriously.
Because the principal objective of the conference was to heighten
the consciousness of the bench and the bar about state constitutions, it
is useful briefly to summarize the considerable light which the essays
shed on the present state of state constitutional law.5 As is typical
when many contributors address the same overall topic, the essays
tend to overlap. Following the lead of Professor A.E. Dick Howard's
excellent introductory overview, 6 I shall therefore focus on the essayists' joint contributions rather than on each essay by itself.
An important item on the conference agenda was the identification
of existing resources that serve to assist in the interpretation of state
constitutions. Unanimously persuaded of the legitimacy of independent state constitutions and of the capacity of state supreme courts to
implement their provisions, the essayists urged state judges to cast a
wide net. In the words of Ronald Collins, "state law must be asserted,
by bench and bar, as if it actually were law in the sense that it imposes
limits on government [that are] independent of those mandated by the
3. The faculty essayists are Ronald K.L. Collins, Adjunct Professor of Law, Willamette University; A.E. Dick Howard, White Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs, University of Virginia; William W. Greenhalgh, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
James C. Kirby, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; Sanford Levinson, Professor,
University of Texas School of Law; Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; and Robert F. Williams, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University

School of Law, Camden. The other essayists are distinguished state jurists: Justice Shirley A.
Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court; Justice Hans A. Linde, Oregon Supreme Court; Justice
Stanley Mosk, California Supreme Court; Justice Stewart G. Pollock, New Jersey Supreme
Court; and Justice Robert F. Utter, Washington Supreme Court.
4. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts (pp. 5-6).
5. To supplement the substantive analyses of the various essays, many of which are extensively footnoted, Developments includes a comprehensive bibliography entitled "State Constitutional Law Resources" (pp. 317-35). In addition, Professor Greenhalgh's essay concludes with a
topic-by-topic list of state court cases that have interpreted state court constitutions to provide
criminal defendants greater protection than they are currently afforded under the federal constitution. Greenhalgh, Independent andAdequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short ofIt (pp.
222-34).
6. Howard, Introduction: A FrequentRecurrence to FundamentalPrinciples (p. xi).
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federal Constitution."7
Analysis of a state constitutional provision, Justice Robert F. Utter
suggests, involves a critical examination of text, an inquiry into intent,
and an appraisal of current values. 8 With regard to textual analysis, a
number of essayists caution against the ready assumption that state
constitutions should be read as sharing an identity of design with the
federal Constitution.9 It unfortunately always bears repeating that
close reading of particular language is essential to informed understanding. 10 Many state constitutions contain provisions, such as those
conferring rights to public education," to environmental protection,12
and to equal protection of the laws without regard to "ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability," 13 that have no fed-

eral counterparts. Other state constitutional provisions may bear a
misleading linguistic similarity to federal provisions drafted for different purposes at a different time in history.' 4 Even when the language
of the state and federal constitutions is identical, state courts should
not reflexively rely on federal precedents to the exclusion of considered
inferences drawing on local historical, political, and social factors. Instead, state courts should consult the precedents of sister states construing similar state constitutional provisions, just as state courts have
always looked to the law of other states for new common law developments in torts and contracts and property.
Given the indeterminacy of constitutional language, state courts
will frequently want to inquire into the intent of those responsible for
its drafting or adoption. State constitutional conventions have not regularly spawned state equivalents of The Federalist,15 although tempo7. Collins, supra note 4 (p. 3; emphasis in original); see also Utter, Freedom andDiversity in a
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutionsand the Washington Declaration of Rights
(pp. 239-45).
8. Utter, supra note 7 (pp. 250-61).
9. Collins, supra note 4 (p. 6); Linde, E Pluribus - ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts
(pp. 278-81); Utter, supra note 7 (p. 248).
10. Collins, supra note 4 (pp. 5-7). The general aversion to the careful reading of statutes,
and by extension of constitutions, is noted in Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World:
An Address, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 995, 998-1000 (1982).
11. For a series of Connecticut cases seeking to define rights under Connecticut's constitutional guarantee of free public education, CONN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1,compare Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton 1); Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 445
A.2d 579 (1982) (Horton11); and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III) (all illustrating an expansive view of art. 8, § 1), with Campbell v. Board of Educ., 193
Conn. 93, 475 A.2d 289 (1984) (illustrating a more restrictive reading of art. 8, § 1, relying in
part on analogies drawn from federal constitutional precedents). See generally Comment, Academic or DisciplinaryDecisions: When is Due ProcessRequired? Campbell v. Board of Education, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT L. Rav. 391 (1985).
12. Pollock, State Constitutions,Land Use, and PublicResources: The Gift Outright(p. 146).
13. CONN. CONST.amends., art. XXL
14. Some state constitutions in fact antedated the federal constitution. Howard, supranote 6
(pp. xii-xiii).
15. Linde, supra note 9 (p. 294).
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rally proximate judicial opinions occasionally may reflect the
contemporaneous understanding of recently adopted constitutional
language. In the absence of useful precedents about the meaning of
individual provisions, courts must look to the agenda of the constitution as a whole in the context of the historical and sociological issues
that occupied center stage at the time of ratification. As Professor
Robert Williams notes, some state constitutions contain constitutional
guarantees that were intended as principles of government rather than
as rights appropriate for judicial enforcement. Constitutions written
during the Jacksonian era, designed to protect against legislative
grants of special privileges to favored minorities, do not carry the same
meaning as do constitutions concerned about governmental discrimination against minorities.1 6 State constitutions thus exhibit much
greater diversity in origin and in agenda - some were intended, for
example, to facilitate acceptance into the union 17 - than we are accustomed to contemplate from a federal vantage point.
State constitutions must, furthermore, be construed to relate openended constitutional language to modem-day reality. The insights derived from historical analysis may be inconclusive or may be irrelevant
to conditions that no longer resemble those that were contemplated
when the constitution was promulgated. In such circumstances, state
courts, operating within the proper, albeit indefinite, boundaries of judicial restraint, should interpret their constitutions to enable the
state's constitutional law to reflect modem values. Although state
constitutions are more readily amended than is the federal constitution, 18 state judges bear an independent responsibility for making state
constitutions adaptable to current conditions.
Even this brief summary should make it clear that the Developments resource catalogue still requires a good deal of innovative research and thought for the supplemental briefs in State v. Jewett.19
Recalling Connecticut's troublesome state constitutional cases of recent years, I must observe that the necessarily generalized instruction
given by Developments would not have provided specific guidance for
answers to such questions as competing local and state claims for
funding of public school education or conflicting interests of political
speech and private property at large shopping centers. 20 That is not
16. Williams, Equality and State ConstitutionalLaw (pp. 76-77).

17. Utter, supranote 7 (p. 244) (describing the circumstances surrounding the state of Washington's Constitutional Convention of 1889).
18. The manner and the consequence of the state amendment process are discussed in
Wilkes, The New Federalism in CriminalProcedurein 1984: Death of the Phoenix?(pp. 175-82),
and in Linde, supra note 9 (p. 291).

19. 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985); see text accompanying note 1 supra.
20. In Horton II 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985), the Connecticut Supreme Court
struggled to devise a standard of review for legislative response to a state-created right to public
education that would accommodate the vindication of a right that had been denominated fundamental in Horton Z 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), and yet recognize the political realities
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surprising because even in federal constitutional law, except for inquiries into the legitimacy of judicial review, the relevant point of reference is not constitutional law writ large but rather the law of the
commerce clause or of the first amendment, or even the law of free
exercise of religion or of free speech within the first amendment.2 1 Be-

cause of generations of neglect - for which state courts undoubtedly
bear a great deal of the responsibility - state constitutional law is still

in its infancy. There are as yet few areas in which
state constitutional
22
learning has produced definitive legal models.

In light of the relative sparsity of state constitutional law at the
present time, the crucial question to me is the extent to which state
courts can or should eschew all reliance on federal law in the development of relevant local precedents. That question should, I believe, be
answered less doctrinally than many of the essayists in Developments
would advocate.
In thinking about federalism as viewed from the state perspective,

I believe it is useful to break down the question of state-federal constitutional overlap into three component parts, which bear varying de-

grees of separate attention. First, is a federal construction of a federal
constitutional provision ever binding on a state court's construction of

a state constitution? Second, can state courts ever compel state litigants to exhaust the remedies independently afforded to them under
the state constitution before permitting them recourse to federal constitutional rights? Third, can federal construction of a federal constiwith which the legislature had been confronted. In Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48,
469 A.2d 1201 (1984), in which the court was asked to determine the extent to which the private
owner of a shopping center was required, by the state constitution, to permit access for the
exercise of rights of free speech, the court divided over appropriate standards of constitutional
construction. Professor Levinson describes the state and federal history of such litigation and
notes the significance of a potential conflict between the presumed "content-neutrality" of free
speech guarantees and the countervailing right of the state, exercising its police power, to regulate a public forum. Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property
Under State ConstitutionalLaw (p. 57). Professor Kay has analyzed the difficult questions of the
scope of constitutional review that the case presented. Kay, The Jurisprudenceof the Connecticut
Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REv. 667 (1984). Professor Macgill notes that Westfarms required the
court to confront, at one time, previously untested state constitutional principles of free speech
and virtually unexplored doctrines of state action. Macgill, Anomaly, Adequacy, and the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REv. 681 (1984). State judges would welcome further elaboration of the problems identified by each of these articles.
21. See Danzig, Justice Frankfurter'sOpinions in the FlagSalute Cases: Blending Logic and
Psychologic in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 675, 680-82 (1984).
22. Two of the Developments essays begin to take on this challenging task. Professor Kirby
notes that state courts under their due process or their equal protection clauses are scrutinizing
the reasonableness of legislative regulation of business activities. "The most significant development," he notes, "is the trend under equal protection toward an intermediate standard of review
that causes statutory classifications to be reviewed on the basis of actual instead of imagined and
hypothetical factual bases." Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under
State Constitutions (pp. 109-10). Justice Pollock observes that common law principles such as
the public trust doctrine may supplement state constitutional provisions in the area of land use
regulation. Pollock, supra note 12 (pp. 154-57).
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tutional provision ever be relevant to a state court's formulation of
independent state constitutional principles?
As to the first question, I concur wholeheartedly with all of the
essayists that every state has the independent authority to interpret its
own constitution without being bound by federal precedents. It is indeed ironic that state court authority definitively to interpret state statutes is universally taken for granted while state court authority to
interpret the state's organic document, its constitution, is deemed controversial. Under our federal system of dual sovereignty, state constitutions embody the reservation to the states of all residual power not
expressly or impliedly conferred upon the federal government. 23 State
courts therefore must be empowered to determine, in light of state interests and state history, what meaning to attribute to provisions contained in state constitutions. If such provisions are interpreted to
provide rights less than those guaranteed by the federal Constitution,
then in application, but not in interpretation, state law must give way
to the supremacy of federal law under the federal Constitution. As
Professor Greenhalgh reminds us, until 1914, the authority of the
United States Supreme Court to review state court judgments "was
limited to cases in which the state court either held against a federal
claim while upholding a state law, or held a federal law invalid." 24
Although the United States Supreme Court now has the jurisdiction to
review any state court interpretation of any federal claim, the authority thus bestowed does not extend to overturning state interpretations
of state constitutions that confer independent state-based rights
greater than those provided by federal law.
Although Michigan v. Long 2 5 imposes limitations of process upon
the division of authority over state and federal constitutional rights, it
does not fundamentally undermine the principles of dual sovereignty.
State court judges may regret a shift that replaces the presumption
that state constitutional decisions were independently based in state
law, and hence unreviewable, with a presumption that such decisions
were federally derived, and hence within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Along with Justice Stevens, we may wonder why an
overburdened federal court needs to concern itself with matters within
state court competence. 26 Nonetheless, state courts can learn to put
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (Modern Library ed.
1937), quoted in Utter, supra note 7 (p. 241) (quoting Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 237, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981)).
24. Greenhalgh, supra note 5 (p. 213).
25. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983):
"[W]hen ...a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so."
26. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., California
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on the record their intention that their decisions interpreting their
state constitutions are independent of federal law. Only if the United
States Supreme Court were to go behind such statements of intent, to
interpolate ambiguity where none existed, 2 7 would state authority be
in jeopardy.
The second question concerns the authority of state courts to insist
on invocation of state constitutional remedies before a litigant may
have recourse to his federal constitutional rights. The foremost spokesman for that position is Justice Hans A. Linde. Although his essay in
Developments restates his view, it is most clearly articulated in an earlier article:
Every state supreme court, I suppose, has declared that it will not needlessly decide a case on a constitutional ground if other legal issues can
dispose of the case. The identical principle applies when examining that
part of the state's law which is in its own constitution. In my view, a
state court should always consider its state constitution before the Federal Constitution. It owes its state the respect to consider the state constitutional question even when counsel does not raise it, which is most of
the time. The same court probably would not let itself be pushed into
striking down a state law before considering
that law's proper interpreta28
tion. The principle is the same.
In Justice Linde's view, there is a hierarchical relationship between
state and federal constitutions in which the position of first priority is
assigned to the state constitutions. With all respect to a friend and a
colleague whom I much admire, I wonder!
One logical inference from the Linde position assigning a first priority to the state constitution is that state constitutional rights may not
be waived by litigants preferring to rely on the federal Constitution.
Such an anti-waiver rule raises both practical and jurisprudential difficulties. Suppose, for example, that a defendant in a criminal prosecution maintains that his confession should have been suppressed
v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 566-71 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. In Michigan v. Long, the Court purported to continue to recognize the independent authority of state construction of state constitutions: "If the state court decision indicates clearly
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision." 463 U.S. at 1041. Several of
the essayists view this representation with skepticism. See, ag., Wilkes, supra note 18 (pp. 18283); Greenhalgh, supra note 5 (pp. 216-17). I agree with Justice Mosk that, if state police officers
can learn to master the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), state
supreme court justices can learn to articulate that "any federal precedents mentioned in the
opinion - in the words of Michigan v. Long - 'are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.'" Mosk, State Constitutionalism after Warren:Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow (p. 207). Faced with such an articulation, the Supreme Court of the United States would be hard put to reconcile federal review of a
state court's declaration of state constitutional rights with continued adherence to the principles
of federalism. Id.
28. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV.
379, 383 (1980).
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because local police continued his custodial interrogation despite his
unequivocal request for the assistance of counsel. Under federal law,

this is a fairly straightforward Miranda29 case, simplified by the
bright-line rule of Edwards v. Arizona 30 and Smith v. Illinois.31 As a
federal case, the dispositive issues are normally factual and limited in
scope: Was the accused in custody during the interrogation? Did the
accused invoke his right to counsel? Did the accused subsequently

waive his right to counsel? There may well be no state constitutional
guidelines whatsoever about implementation of a right against self-incrimination in a custodial setting. 32 If in such circumstances defense

counsel elects to rely upon what is alleged to be a clear violation of
federal law under Miranda, it is doubtful that a state court would be
well-advised to require counsel, often a heavily overburdened public
defender, to engage in time-consuming primary research in the state

historical library. No reason of policy serves to distinguish state constitutional rights in this context from other constitutional rights that
have generally been thought to be subject to knowing and intelligent
relinquishment or abandonment. 33 Finally, the logic of federalism, in

a system in which state courts are charged with the enforcement of
federal as well as state law, counsels against the engrafting of state law
34
conditions onto federally guaranteed rights.

A less draconian inference from the Linde position would invoke
its strictures only when a party has chosen to rely on both state and

federal constitutional rights. It may of course be the case that counsel
have extensively researched and forcefully argued the implications to
be drawn from the language of the relevant state constitutional provi-

sions. Let me postpone consideration of that case. More often, as was

true in State v. Jewett,35 counsel will have cited the state constitution

without much if anything by way of exegesis. Since a court may always insist on adequate briefing of any issue, a fortiori a court may
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
31. 105 S.Ct. 490 (1984).
32. This is a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that state courts, in Justice Linde's view,
cannot selectively incorporate federal constitutional doctrine, but must instead ground their decisions in the letter and spirit of their own state constitutions.
33. See, eg., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (right of an accused to counsel may
be waived). Counsel should of course understand that victory in a state court on a federal issue
leaves that victory subject to federal review and to the vagaries of unanticipated changes in federal law. For that reason, the short-run attraction of waiving a state claim must be weighed
against the long-term advantage of a dispositive resolution in a state court. In that balance,
waiver may well be difficult to justify. Nonetheless, it should not be precluded.
34. "Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that
the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be
defeated under the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923); see Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120-29
(1978).
35. 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985); see text accompanying note 1 supra.
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reserve to itself the decision whether it is willing to undertake in-

dependent construction of relatively unexplored state constitutional
provisions without the assistance of counsel. It is worth remembering
that adequate consideration of a state constitutional provision, by
bench or bar, is usually, in Justice Linde's view, a demanding under-

taking. Neither federal cases, nor familiar, federally articulated statements of the underlying issue, are reliable guidelines for state
constitutional law. 36 If, for any number of prudential reasons, 37 the
court determines in the absence of an adequate supporting brief not to
address the state constitutional issue, I believe the court would not, for
that reason, be discharged of its duty to resolve any questions of federal constitutional law that had been properly presented. Similarly, if
the supplemental briefs ordered in State v. Jewett prove to be disappointing, the Vermont court could not indefinitely postpone decision
on whatever federal issues the case may concurrently have raised. Despite a court's fervent wish that counsel fully educate themselves and
the judiciary about the language, intent, history, and values of the
state constitution, a court cannot order a tie-in sale of state and federal

constitutional rights.
The least controversial version of assigning a preferred position to
state constitutional rights would be to look first to state constitutional
rights when counsel have presented an adequate analytic record for
both state and federal constitutional claims. In that situation, the current practice of state supreme courts apparently varies: some, like Or-

egon, consider state claims first, while others, like New Jersey, resolve
federal claims initially, looking to the federal law to provide a back-

drop for the construction of state constitutional rights. 38 My own

36. In his Developments essay, Justice Linde deplores the current association of individual
rights and fair procedures with federal law,
even when they [are] also guaranteed in the state constitutions.... People do not claim
rights against self-incrimination, they "take the fifth" and expect "Mirandawarnings." Unlawful searches are equated with fourth amendment violations. Journalists do not invoke
freedom of the press, they demand their first amendment rights. All claims of unequal
treatment are phrased as denials of equal protection of the laws.
Linde, supra note 9 (p. 279).
37. In adverting to prudential considerations, I do not mean to suggest that I subscribe to the
view of those critics of the new federalism who fear, as Justice Abrahamson puts it, that "the
state court cannot take the heat that comes from deciding the tough individual rights cases."
Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions (p. 308). State court judges have always understood that they operate in closer proximity to the electorate than do their federal
counterparts. Tough cases that may lead to unpopular results arise regularly in state court litigation that in no way implicates the state constitution. In recent Connecticut case law, for example, a statutory holding that a statute of limitations barred a prosecution for murder, State v.
Paradise, 189 Conn. 346, 456 A.2d 305 (1983), was as inherently controversial as the constitutional holding, in another prosecution for murder, that egregious prosecutorial misconduct required a new trial. State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
967 (1985). I refer instead to a philosophy of prudence that acknowledges the desirability of an
accommodation between principles and reality, between abstract theories and practical wisdom.
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
38. See Collins, supra note 4 (pp. 8-9 & n.74).
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view is more eclectic. Although I agree with Justice Linde that reflexive state court deference to federal claims is unwarranted, I believe the
question of what claims to consider, and in what sequence, is a matter
of choice best decided in the context of the particular case before the
court. Courts are fortunate when they have the freedom to select the
vehicle for the enunciation or elaboration of doctrine. In exercising
powers of judicial review, state courts act with appropriate prudence
when they recognize that law, like politics, is the art of the possible,
that judicial decisions that postpone final judgment may sometimes
usefully permit principled consideration of an issue by other branches
of government and the public, in short that such decisions may avoid
needless confrontation. 39 The choice of the right case for the development of a new area in the law is an important part of the common law
tradition that looks to incremental pragmatism and seasoned skepticism, to a search for a fit between the law that was and the law that
will be.40 State supreme court judges are generalists whose expertise is
in the methodology of the common law. Whether our agenda is the
reconsideration of common law cases, the contextual construction of
statutes, 4 1 or the development of constitutional principles, we best
serve the interests of justice if we build upon our common law
strengths and make haste slowly.
Viewing state constitutional law from the relativist vantage point
of the common law tradition, rather than from the absolutist vantage
point of dual sovereignty, enables us also to define a proper answer to
my third question, the role of federal precedents in the formulation of
state constitutional law. At the outset, such a viewpoint is conducive
to taking a more relaxed attitude than do some of the Developments
essayists toward the prevalence of federally derived nomenclature for
overlapping state and federal constitutional rights. For better or
worse, the prophylactic rules of Miranda42 are today firmly embedded
in the legal landscape of the law of self-incrimination. Federally based
rules relating to Terry4 3 stops are engrained in our law of search and
seizure. The fact that lawyers and judges unconsciously reach for
such metaphors in thinking about all constitutional rights is undoubtedly a psychological impediment to independent construction of state
constitutions. But aversion to inappropriate analogies should not
overshadow the reality that some, nay most, federal constitutional law
is worthy of serious consideration in the interpretation of state constitutions. Just as it is wrong to assume that state constitutions are mere
39. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69-72 (1962).
40. See G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92-101 (1981);
Kronman, supra note 37.
41. See Peters, supra note 10, at 998-1005.
42. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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mirror images of the Federal Constitution, so it is wrong to assume
that independent state constitutions share no principles with their federal counterpart. The interstices of open-ended state constitutions remain to be filled, and many of them will best be filled by adopting into
state law, on a case-by-case basis, persuasive constitutional doctrines
from federal law and from sister states. Plausible candidates for incorporation, for reading federal law into state constitutions, are the doctrines establishing a preferred position for free speech in the hierarchy
of individual rights and requiring special scrutiny of laws discriminating on the basis of race. Some of the barely unsuccessful dissenting
opinions of United States Supreme Court Justices might usefully be
incorporated into state constitutional doctrine as well. 44 In order to
establish for state constitutional law the vital role to which state judges
aspire, we cannot automatically abandon sources of insight, whatever
their origin or their linguistic formulation. The teachings of the common law tradition, which emphasizes the value of gradual reform in
preference to dramatic change, counsel the wisdom of searching for
commonality rather than discontinuity in state and federal
constitutions.
To say that the differences between federal and state constitutional
law should not be overstated is not to subscribe to a view of state constitutional law that relegates the state constitution to the role of an
interstitial supplement to the Federal Constitution. State courts must
have the strength and the will to undertake the painstaking task of
assigning independent meaning to independent state constitutions. In
that painstaking task, let us welcome assistance whatever its auspices,
confident that our traditional learning in the common law will enable
us to meet the challenge.

44. In an area where state courts have a good deal of institutional competence - the review
of criminal convictions - reliance on state constitutions has often taken the form of adapting
some aspect of federal constitutional law to local needs for supervision of local police or
prosecutorial authorities. Thus, in State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985), the
Connecticut Supreme Court recently decided to rely on Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), rather than on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983). Similarly, in State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 967 (1985), the court distinguished the holding of Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). The
interpretation of the state constitution in these cases, and in similar decisions in other jurisdictions, was immeasurably facilitated by the doctrinal development of federal law under the fourth
and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. That law can be a useful model even
when state courts determine to depart from it. See Mosk, supra note 27.

